Fordham Law Review
Volume 69

Issue 5

Article 7

2001

Citizenship Talk: A Revisionist Narrative
T. Alexander Aleinikoff

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizenship Talk: A Revisionist Narrative, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 1689 (2001).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol69/iss5/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

THE CONSTITUTION OF EQUAL CITIZENSHIP
FOR A GOOD SOCIETY
CITIZENSHIP TALK:
A REVISIONIST NARRATIVE 1
T. Alexander Aleinikoff*
Discussions of citizenship-now widespread in both legal and nonlegal academic literature-come at a time when many wonder
whether the concept is anachronistic. Linked with a quickly fading
notion of "nation-state sovereignty," the idea of citizenship is under
attack from supra-, trans-, and post-national forces, from high rates of
immigration in Western states that have led to multicultural and
multi-ethnic societies, and from sub-national demands of indigenous
groups and ethnic minorities for some forms of autonomy or selfdetermination.
It is not surprising that we are continuing to talk about citizenship
at the very time the world appears to be evolving past it. It still has
real appeal as a political matter. The left, in a post-Thatcher/postReagan world, remains interested in a politics of redistribution and
empowerment; and these goals, it is thought, are best pursued within a
national construct.- The right sees citizenship as a response to
multiculturalism, providing a basis for national unity that resists
demands for group-based rights (frequently characterized as "special
rights" that go against the idea of common, and equal, citizenship).
Citizenship also appeals to political moderates in search of a kind of
neutral social glue3 that can hold together a multi-ethnic society. The
concept is identified with a set of shared values-liberty, equality, and
tolerance-that stand above racial, economic, and social groups.
American constitutional law has an implicit and powerful narrative
that portrays citizenship as a core concept in a liberal democratic
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
1. This presentation is a brief summary of themes developed in T.A. Aleinikoff,
Semblances of Sovereignty: The Constitution, the State and American Citizenship
(Harvard Univ. Press forthcoming 2002).
*

2. EJ. Hobsbawm, The Futureof the State, 6 J. Int'l Dev. 267,272 (1994).
3. Frederick Schauer, Conununity, Citizenship, and the Search for National
Identity, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1504, 1505-06 (1986).
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state.
The narrative begins with the opening words of the
Constitution, "We, the People." It recognizes that, in ante-bellum
America, the Constitution defined a herrenvolk democracy-made
most palpable in Chief Justice Taney's opinion in Dred Scott v.
Sanford4 declaring that free blacks were not citizens of the United

States. But citizenship came home in the Fourteenth Amendment,
which defined United States citizenship in its first clause. It again falls
on hard times in Minor v. Happersett,5 Elk v. Wilkins,6 and under Jim
Crow. The concept is ultimately redeemed, however, by the work of
the suffragists, the NAACP, the "Second Reconstruction" Congress,
and the Warren Court. Back on track (again), the future looks rosy.
From a liberal perspective, the guarantee of "equal citizenship" can
identify and invalidate forms of discrimination now deemed to impose
a second-class citizenship (such as sexual orientation, disability, and
maybe even poverty).
And neo-republicanism promises a
(re)invigoration of citizenship-as-participation -from robust political
involvement to bowling together. These two perspectives-somewhat
in tension-unite in an alliance for progress, breaking down barriers
to full participation in public spheres, and drawing us out of our
private groups toward public concerns.
I believe the narrative gets it wrong, both in its objects of analysis
and its teleology. A narrative of citizenship that focuses on equality
and adopts race discrimination as its central case misses the point that
citizenship is fundamentally a status that connotes membership in a
polity, and it fails to see that the story of non-members and members
of "quasi-polities" may be as significant as the story of disfavored full
members. A broader narrative would look beyond the concept of
second-class citizenship, examining membership through the eyes of
immigrants, Indians, and residents in United States territories.
This revisionist narrative takes full note of late nineteenth century
Supreme Court decisions involving federal power over immigration,7
Indians,8 and newly acquired territories. 9 In each instance, the
Justices concluded that Congress possessed "plenary power" to
regulate in the area; the Court would apply virtually no constitutional
limitations on congressional authority. Behind these cases-which I
will jointly label "the sovereignty cases"-lay a vision of the United
States as a nation-state: a state endowed with the power to control its
4. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 399 (1857).
5. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1874) (holding constitutional a statute denying the
franchise to women).
6. 112 U.S. 94, 109 (1884) (holding that Indians born in tribes are not U.S.
citizens under the Fourteenth Amendment).

7. See The Chinese Exclusion Case (Chae Chan Ping v. United States), 130 U.S.

581 (1889); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).

8. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
9. See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901). See also In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453
(1891).
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territory and take its place as an equal among other foreign states; and
a nation that defined itself in ethno-racial terms as Anglo-Saxon. The
sovereignty cases reflect the imperialism and racism of their day.
Immigrants, Indians, and residents of the territories are portrayed as
the "white man's burden," not ready for participation in Anglo-Saxon
institutions of governance. Policies regulating these groups shifted
back and forth between exclusion and assimilation, based on
prevailing assumptions about whether the members of the groups
could be "civilized."
These are unappealing cases to read, containing language harsh to
today's sensibilities. Nonetheless, they continue to define the Court's
approach to congressional power over immigration, Indian tribes, and
the territories."0 How have these areas of constitutional law remained
immune from the constitutional evolution (and revolution) of the
twentieth century? Should not mature and benevolent norms of equal
citizenship and individual rights apply? My claim is that the idea of
citizenship has been as much a problem as a solution. This is apparent
in a place where we might least expect to find it: the collected works
of the Warren Court.
Powerful pieces have been written about the Warren Court's
interest in citizenship. Kenneth Karst identified a norm of "equal
citizenship" implicit in the Warren Court's Fourteenth Amendment
cases." Karst's analysis provides an important insight into the Court's
work on race and fundamental rights. But I would place these cases in
a context broader than equality. The Warren Court acted to protect
the status of citizenship as well as to ensure that citizens were equal in
the rights they possessed. Thus, in Afroyim v. Rusk,"2 the Court held
that Congress had no power to unilaterally terminate the citizenship
of United States citizens. 3 And in Reid v. Covert,4 the Court imposed
constitutional restrictions on military trials of civilian dependents of
overseas military personnel.15 These cases, in combination with the
equality cases and the further incorporation of the Bill of Rights
against the states, lead me to describe the Warren Court's agenda as
guaranteeing full citizenship. If the United States saw itself as a
nation-state at the close of the nineteenth century, the Warren Court
completed America's transformation to a citizen-state.
Identifying citizenship as a special concern of the Warren Court
offers an explanation for its unwillingness to rethink the plenary
10. E.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977).
11. Kenneth L. Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth

Amendment, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1977). See also Charles L. Black, Jr., The
Unfinished Business of the Warren Court,46 Wash. L Rev. 3,8-9 (1970).
12. 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
13. Id at 267-68.
14. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).

15. Id at 5.
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power cases. By defining insiders, the concept of citizenship
necessarily defines outsiders; and by guaranteeing full and equal rights
for those within the charmed circle, it supports fewer rights-or at
least less attention-for those outside the circle. This result is not
compelled: it might be plausible, for example, to characterize aliens as
a "discrete and insular" minority, thereby justifying an active,
protective role for the courts on their behalf. 6 Yet, significantly, the
Warren Court's equality campaign was not waged on behalf of aliens.
Graham v. Richardson,17 which applies strict scrutiny to state laws
discriminating on the basis of alienage, is a Burger Court decision."
The only major immigration case of the Warren Court is its decision
in Boutilier v. INS, 9 which involved a challenge to a provision in the
immigration code mandating the exclusion of any alien from the
United States who was "afflicted with a psychopathic personality."" °
The statutory term had been interpreted by administrative authorities,
based on an accurate appreciation of congressional intent, to
encompass homosexuals, and the exclusion ground was challenged as
unconstitutionally vague.
The Court rejected the claim, stating that "[t]he constitutional
requirement of fair warning has no applicability to standards.., for
admission of aliens to the United States."'" It followed with a
reaffirmation of Congress' plenary power doctrine, nailed down by a
cite to the 1889 decision in the Chinese Exclusion Case.2 (The
offensive provision was not removed from the immigration law until
1990.)
The situations of Indians and residents in United States territories
present different problems for citizenship. Both groups are citizens by
virtue of federal statutes passed in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. From the start, however, citizenship meant less
here than might be expected. The federal laws imposing citizenship
were largely unilateral decisions of Congress, and they were enacted
with no thought that they would materially advance the rights of the
beneficiaries. Thus, shortly after Puerto Ricans were granted United
States citizenship, the Supreme Court ruled that the Sixth
Amendment's right to a jury trial did not apply to criminal
prosecutions brought in Puerto Rico.2 The Warren Court left the
territories cases where it found them. 4
16. See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust 161-62 (1980).
17. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
18. Id. at 376.
19. 387 U.S. 118 (1967).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 123.
22. Id. at 123-24.
23. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 306 (1922).
24. Three Justices joined Justice Black in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), who
asserted that "neither [the Insular Cases] nor their reasoning should be given any
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The Warren Court's citizenship agenda could not be easily applied
to the Indian tribes. "Footnote Four" concerns might well have led
the Court to be sensitive to assertions of tribal sovereignty, but its
promotion of individual rights suggested limits on tribes that could
undercut sovereignty. Whatever the reason, Congress' plenary power
over the tribes survived the Warren Court.
The Burger Court did not pursue the Warren Court's citizenship
agenda.'
But citizenship makes a comeback with the Rehnquist
Court-albeit with a decidedly different emphasis than the Warren
Court. For the Warren Court, citizenship was an inclusionary,
empowering concept. Claims of sovereignty and group rights did not
quite fit the construct, and the Court put them to the side. The
Rehnquist Court, however, has used citizenship as a sword, wielded
on behalf of individuals to cut down governmental actions on behalf
of groups. Color-conscious measures and tribal authority over nonmembers threaten the formal equality of those within the circle of
citizenship. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 26 is therefore of a
piece with Duro v. Reina,27 which denied tribes the power to try nonmembers for crimes committed on reservation lands Similarly,
citizenship figures strongly in the Court's holding in Rice v.
Cayetano,29 invalidating on Fifteenth Amendment grounds a
Hawaiian statute that limited voters for trustees for the Office of
Hawaiian Affairs to Native Hawaiians.' Regarding immigration, the
Rehnquist Court followed the Warren Court, upholding government
action against aliens that would not be tolerated if imposed on
citizens.31
In sum, my revisionist narrative of citizenship is not one of
continued progress (since the Second Reconstruction) on behalf of
disempowered groups. While appropriating the Warren Court's
emphasis on citizenship, the Rehnquist Court has mobilized the
concept in a different manner. The citizen-state idealized by the
Warren Court looked to a future of full citizenship for previously
excluded groups. It represented a dramatic shift, in both ideology and
practice, from the nation-state of the late nineteenth century. The
citizen-state of the Rehnquist Court largely affirms existing power
further expansion." Id. at 14. But the Insular Cases were not overturned by the
Warren Court and apparently remain the law today.
25. The application of strict scrutiny to state laws that discriminated on the basis
of alienage provides surprising evidence.
26. 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (invalidating minority business set-aside program for cityawarded construction contracts).
27. 495 U.S. 676 (1991).
28. Id. at 679.
29. 120 S.Ct. 1044 (2000).
30. Id at 1057.
31. See Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999);
Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993).
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relations in the nation, viewing claims of autonomy or group rights as
affronts to the individual equality of citizens.32 As the nation-state
form appears to be weakening, the Court has attempted to hold onto
(or reinscribe) nineteenth century notions of sovereignty.
CONCLUSION

The issues addressed in the plenary power cases are a subset of a
larger category of concerns regarding American sovereignty and
membership-a category I would label "sovereignty studies." In
constitutional law, sovereignty studies would include additional
questions, such as: voting rights for residents of the District of
Columbia, representation in Congress of Indian Tribes and territories,
the constitutionality of the Louisiana Purchase and the Missouri
Compromise, extraterritorial application of United States law, and the
rights of United States citizens overseas. These issues are largely
ignored in constitutional scholarship and casebooks.33
Sovereignty studies can also provide a bridge to new and necessary
inquiries for constitutional law in an age of globalization. What role
should international norms play in our constitutional law? Should our
notions of federalism be reshaped as states become more involved in
foreign affairs and subnational regions seek cross-border alliances?
How does United States participation in the World Trade
Organization affect constitutional understandings of sovereignty?
Does an increasing incidence of dual nationality challenge
constitutional norms regarding acquisition and loss of citizenship? A
constitutional law for a new century must begin to consider
understandings of sovereignty and membership more flexible than
those propounded by the plenary power cases of the nineteenth
century.
32. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999), provides a counter-example.
The
invocation of the privileges and immunities clause to strike down a California statute
restricting the welfare benefits of new residents came as a shock. But it is far from
clear that the Court intends to use Saenz as a springboard for activism on behalf of
citizenship rights. See Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privilegesor
Immunities Revival Portend the Future-Or Reveal the Structure of the Present?, 113
Harv. L. Rev. 110, 153-58 (1999). In any event, there is nothing in Saenz pertaining to
non-citizens (who cannot claim the protection of the privileges and immunities
clause), and it arguably undercuts the claims of subnational groups interested in
preserving local culture by regulating ingress of outsiders.
33. Scholarship in these areas tends to be field-specific; that is, immigration
scholars and Indian law scholars rarely see the connections between their fields. For
important cross-cutting contributions, see Sarah Cleveland, Powers Inherent in
Sovereignty: Indians,Aliens, Territoriesand the Nineteenth-Century Origins of Plenary
Power over Foreign Affairs (unpub. ins., on file with author) and Philip P. Frickey,
DomesticatingFederalIndian Law, 81 Minn. L. Rev. 31 (1996). See also Angela P.
Harris, Equality Trouble:Sameness and Difference in Twentieth-Century Race Law, 88
Cal. L. Rev. 1943-57 (2000); Sanford Levinson, Why the Canon Should be Expanded
to Include The Insular Cases and the Saga of American Expansionism, 17 Const.
Comment. 241 (2000).

